• During bargaining at each period, Q = c A +c B 1−δP represents the expected present and future total surplus from avoiding war if a settlement is reached in equilibrium. Since war is costly, when peace prevails, c A + c B is the surplus for that period, and the total expected surplus is equal to
• The total expected value of the game at the beginning of a given period can be defined similarly. If war occurs for sure in the model, the total value is 1−c A −c B 1−δ , which is the sum of two states' war continuation values. Incorporating the probability of peace and the surplus states receive from it, we get the total expected value of the game as E
Note that, if war is not possible in equilibrium, so that P = 1, E(V ) = 1 1−δ .
• Finally, due to the "take it or leave it" bargaining protocol, A makes the offers in each round, and A receives all the surplus from peace most of the time by making offers that make B indifferent between war and peace in equilibrium. The only exception is when the budget constraint binds, and A cannot force B to her war value as A cannot receive more than the most generous share from bargaining (x=1). Thus, there is a certain range of balance parameters (p * A ,p] at which, B receives some or all of the surplus Q in equilibrium. Atp, A is indifferent between war and peace, thus, all of the surplus goes to B. p * A represents the highest value of the balance at which A receives all of the surplus from peaceful bargaining. Within this interval, B's share of the surplus gets larger as p t gets closer top. Thus, in expectation, B receives the following amount of surplus from bargaining: S A = p p * A pt−p * A 1−δ f (p t )dp t .
We now characterize the endogenous parameters of the model. First, p that makes B indifferent between accepting the whole pie and going to war needs to satisfy the following equation:
The right hand side (RHS) is what B receives if B attacks when the balance is p (when B is stronger than average based on F(p)). The left hand side (LHS) is the continuation value from accepting the most generous offer from A (x=0), and the expected payoff from the future. The expected future payoff has four components. First, future may entail a strong enough A that is willing to attack (p t >p); a strong enough B that attacks p t < p; peace prevails and A receives all the surplus from bargaining; and finally some of the surplus (S A ) goes to B through bargaining. In the first three scenarios, B receives its war payoff, and the fourth one adds S A to B's payoff from its outside option of war.
Second,p represents the balance value that gives A an advantage over the long term average balance so that A is indifferent between keeping the whole pie to himself that period and attacking B. This indifference condition is represented by
As in the previous equation, the RHS is A's payoff from attacking B and ending the game when the balance favors A atp. The LHS is A's payoff when A receives the whole issue at stake at period t (x=1), and expected payoff from future periods. As in the previous case, future could involve war initiated by either side, or peaceful bargaining. In all these scenarios, A at least receives his war payoff, which equals to p−c A 1−δ in expectation. When peace prevails, A also enjoys all the surplus from peace (QP ), except when the budget constraint binds and some of this surplus (S A ) goes to B.
To identify the range in which B receives some of the surplus, first observe that the two states' expected shares when peace prevails should sum up to the total value of the game, E(V ). Thus, when A receives all the surplus from bargaining at p * A , B's total share is her war payoff
The LHS is the same as in Equation 2, where A receives the largest feasible share from bargaining (x=1).
Finally, the above equation can also be used to calculate the equilibrium offer x * when peace prevails, i.e. when p ≤ p t ≤p. First, note that as long as it is feasible (x ≤ 1), A prefers making the A2 offer that leaves B indifferent between accepting and war. This offer solves the following equation:
Equation 3 implies thatx > 1 when p t > p * A . Thus, when p * A ≤ p t ≤p, A offers x = 1 instead and leaves some of the surplus to B. Hence, the equilibrium offer is x * = min{1,x} when p ≤ p t ≤p.
The endogenous equilibrium parameters p,p, and x * are simultaneously determined from the above non-linear system of equations. Since the non-linear system of equations in this lemma does not have a closed form solution, in our simulations we employ numerical optimization using the BB package in R to calculate the cutpoints for a given set of exogenous parameters.
Model Extension
The model in the manuscript has actors account for the present round's realization of the balance parameter in determining the cutpoints for attacking. How significant is it for the overall probability of peace that states take present realizations into account as opposed to only using past realizations?
To see this, we compare states cutpoints when they only take into account past realizations versus both past and present. This comparison is presented in Figure A1 . The green dashed lines are states' cutpoints (p * for the top line and p * for the bottom line representing A and B's cutpoints, respectively) when, at any given period t, states only use the past realizations from period 1 up to period t-1 to estimate the distribution. In contrast, the red solid lines are when at any given period t, states include period t's realization as well in their calculations for cutpoints (call themp * * and p * * for A and B, respectively) as in from Scenario 1 or 2 above. The resulting cutpoints are more extreme, and hence, peace becomes more likely. To see the intuition for why the second version is more peaceful, consider the case in which, at period t, the realized balance parameter exactly equals p * . This is the point when state A is indifferent between attacking and not attacking when only past realizations are taken into account, and assume, for the sake of the example, that state A attacks at this point when only past realizations are used to approximate the distribution. Now consider the second possibility, in which the present realization is also taken into account in calculations.
This new extreme realization results in a revision of the estimated distribution. In particular, the mean of the estimated distribution increases, making the distribution, and hence the future outlook relatively more favorable to A compared to the past period's estimate. Thus, A no longer prefers attacking at p =p * , as it is no longer a fleeting advantage that creates a temporary window of opportunity and causes a commitment problem. Instead, A uses a more extreme cutpointp * * >p * to attack B. Similar arguments establish that for B as well, more extreme realizations are needed to make attacking attractive in the second version that takes into account the present as well as the past realizations in approximating the distribution.
The manuscript focuses on the case where actors account for past and present realizations because (1) actors are likely to update expectations based on highly salient and readily available (2) it is the substantively more interesting framework. Notes: Logistic regression with directed rivalry dyad year as unit of analysis; standard errors clustered on the directed dyad. Power shocks coded depending on whether realized dyadic balance falls outside of sufficiently wide cutpoints such that only 2% of observations are coded as shocks. Models 1 and 2 include the full sample of observations. We exclude results from a model subset to include only observations with Future Trend values in the most favorable quartile because shocks perfectly predict peace in these instances, consistent with the theoretical implications. Higher order terms for Peace Years are not shown. Joint Democracy drops out of the models due to collinearity with the outcome. 
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Robustness Tests for Quantitative Results
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Benchmarking Estimates of Future Military Capabilities
The objective of the predictive model for future capabilities is to use publicly available data with broad spatial and temporal coverage to approximate the estimative approach leaders or intelligence agencies might use. The manuscript describes the validity of this approach based on prior scholarship (Fordham, 2011; Bell and Johnson, 2015) as well as National Intelligence Estimates from the US intelligence community. Ideally, we could benchmark our approach's predictions versus those from leaders or intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, this is challenging for numerous reasons. First, these estimates are not widely available in a systematic fashion. Second, the comparison is likely to be apples-to-oranges. Our model yields an aggregated capability prediction that includes military expenditures and personnel whereas other benchmarks includes one or the other. Third, existing predictions from, say, think tanks, do not necessarily represent leaders predictions. That is, the purported benchmark may not be a good benchmark.
Noting the impediments, we nonetheless attempt to benchmark projections versus 15 predictions from a RAND study that the Office of the Secretary of Defense funded. 1 Table 5 of that study estimates past and future military spending by country for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 . The countries in the study are US, USSR, Japan, China, West Germany, UK, France, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, Mexico, and Egypt. Because the report was produced in 1989 and our approach focuses on predictions for the next year, we focus the analysis on the 1990 predictions.
The benchmarking exercise includes the following steps. 2 This step facilitates making an apples-to-apples comparison. Otherwise, the CINC based measure captures state military spending as a percentage of global military spending while the RAND measure captures spending in billions of 1986 US dollars. That being said, a model making a non-scaled comparison of our raw projection to RAND's raw projection has an R 2 = 0.88.
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than our projection (the latter of which was more accurate in hindsight). Figure A2 : Comparison of implied military spending estimates from our approach versus one from RAND. Diagonal line represents a hypothetical perfect fit (1:1) between the two projections.
